Abstract. We prove a kind of Curry-Howard isomorphism, with some set of recursive winning strategies taking the place of typed λ-terms, and some set of classical proofs taking the place of intuitionistic proofs.
Introduction
We first sketch what Limit Computable Mathematics is, then we address the problem of finding a formal system for it. Limit Computable Mathematics (from now on, LCM for short) was introduced in [3] as a way to "animate" (to interpret as a program) a classical proof that a formal specification can be satisfied. The motivation was to run a proof on simple examples, as a toy program, in order to find formalization bugs (like false equational axioms), and to check which kind of input/output behavior the specification is describing.
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LCM does not interpret all classical proofs as programs. Yet, it interprets many proofs of common use in applied mathematics. LCM interprets proofs as algorithms "able to learn". These algorithms can do mistakes, they can change their output value if they find out it is wrong, but they can change it only finitely many times. A standard example is the algorithmic interpretation of the proof of Excluded Middle for a semi-decidable statement ∃y.P (n, y) (with P decidable predicate). LCM interprets it as an algorithm learning whether ∃y.P (n, y) is true or false. The algorithm first says that ∃y.P (n, y) is false. Then we are allowed to use the hypothesis ∀y.¬P (n, y) as many times as we want in the following. If we eventually deduce a false conclusion ¬P (n, m), then we know that P (n, m) (and therefore ∃y.P (n, y)) is actually true. In this case the algorithm changes his mind just once, from "∃y.P (n, y) false" to "∃y.P (n, y) true". Every computation which used the assumption ∀y.¬P (n, y) is erased and restarted. More in general, every proof using only Excluded Middle over semi-decidable formulas can be interpreted as a learning algorithm. We conjecture that a kind of converse holds: the only proofs which can be interpreted as "learning algorithms" are ω-proofs using only Excluded Middle over semi-decidable formulas. Many proofs of applied mathematics fall in this class, and can be "animated" using these ideas. In §5.2, we produce an example of a proof (actually, an axiom of classical logic) which, instead, cannot be "animated" using these ideas.
The first semantic proposed for the informal idea of "learning algorithm" was Limit Realization ( [3] ). However, a limitation of this semantic is the lack of readability for algorithms extracted from proofs. A second semantic proposed was a game semantic called "1-backtracking". ( [1] , [4] ). 1-backtracking game semantic is a restriction of the backtracking semantic proposed by T. Coquand in [2] for proofs in ω-arithmetic. 1-backtracking was proved equivalent to Limit Realization Semantic in [1] . For the viewpoint of proof animation, "1-backtracking" has several nice features: it is very intuitive, and quite close to the idea of "learning algorithm" it comes from. It also explain in details how to "run" a proof as a learning algorithm.
In this paper we continue the study of 1-backtracking semantic and we show that recursive winning strategy for 1-backtracking are isomorphic with proof-trees of a suitable fragment P A 1 of ω-Arithmetic. We conjecture that P A 1 derives exactly all intuitionistic consequences of Excluded Middle for semi-decidable formulas. The fragment P A 1 has a simple description: it is classical ω-arithmetic without Exchange rule for sequents (exchange rule for formulas is, instead, an admissible rule).
This isomorphism result is alike to Curry-Howard isomorphism between λ-terms and proofs in natural deduction. It says that recursive winning strategies restate proofs of P A 1 in term of "learning algorithm", without altering their tree structure. The same result implies that theorems of P A 1 are exactly the implication-free valid formulas of LCM . This is the first formal system proposed for some fragment of LCM . Until now, all descriptions of LCM were semantical in nature.
From a technical viewpoint, our result is obtain by adapting an isomorphism result by H. Herbelin [5] , between all cut-free proofs of classical ω-arithmetic from one side, and (full, Coquand's style) backtracking game semantic on the other side. The isomorphism between 1-backtracking and cut-free proofs of P A 1 answers to a question proposed by T. Coquand to the authors.
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This is the plan of the paper. In §2 we introduce 1-backtracking games, and in §3 Tarski games. In 4 P A 1 , we introduce ω-arithmetic without Exchange rule on sequents, and we state the existence of an isomorphism between cut-free proofs and winning strategies with 1-backtracking. In §5 we introduce some examples of proofs we read as winning strategies with 1-backtracking, and, conversely, of winning strategies with 1-backtracking we read as proofs. We also show a classical proof which cannot be interpreted with 1-backtracking.
The proof of the isomorphism result is postponed to the appendix. In §6 we introduce coding and terminology for trees. Then in §7 we derive some properties of proofs, and in §8 introduce a class of intermediate objects between proofs and 2 (T. Coquand, letter of 25/01/2005) Question: if one gives the presentation of cut-free provability for ω-logic (with countable and finite ∧ and ∨ as only connectives) one gets general backtracking. Is there a modification of the rules of cut-free provability such that the proofs correspond to learning strategies [i.e., to 1-backtracking]??
winning strategies we call proof-strategies. Eventually, in §9, 10 we show that proofs, proof-strategies, winning strategies are isomorphic (as trees).
Games and Strategies
In this section we introduce finite games between two players, E (Eloise) and A (Abelard). following [6] . We assume the reader is familiar with tree terminology (see §6). Informally, the set of positions of a game is a tree. The starting position of a play is the root of the tree. There is a "turn" map deciding who moves next from a given position. The player moving next selects a child of the current position of the play, and this becomes the new position of the play. If the play eventually stops, the first player who should move and does not (either because he does not want to, or because he cannot) loses. In some games, the play can continue forever. In this case, some extra rules of the game decide the winner. The formal definition runs as follows.
Definition 2.1.
(1) A game G between two players, E (Eloise) and A (Abelard), is any tuple < T, t, W E , W A >. T is a tree (a set of lists, see §6) over some set E, * E . t is a map from T to {E, A}. (W E , W A ) is a partition of all infinite branches of T .
(2) We call the elements of E moves, the elements of T positions, and the branches of T plays. We call t the turn map. We call position
We identify a finite game G with the list T, t .
We introduce here 1-backtracking game associated to any finite game G. Informally, for a while a 1-backtracking play runs like a play in G. The first player plays x 0 , the next player a child x 1 of x 0 , and so forth. Player E (Eloise), however, can make a new kind of move, called backtracking. If E moves from x i , she can, instead of choosing a child of x i , come back to some previous position x j (with j < i) from which she moved x j+1 . She can decide, this time, to move x i+1 from x j . In this way, in a 1-backtracking game player E has the possibility of learning from her mistakes. If she thinks that the move x j+1 she did from x j is a mistake, she can backtrack to the position x j before such move, and change her move to x i+1 . There is a constraint: E can only backtrack finitely many times to the same move, otherwise she loses. A strategy using 1-backtracking can be considered a learning algorithm in the sense of Hayashi. For more information we refer to [4] , [1] . Here is the formal definition. Remark that the moves in a 1-backtracking game associated to a game G are defined as positions of G, which are defined as list of moves of G. Therefore, formally, positions of a 1-backtracking game associated to G are list of lists of moves of G.
Definition 2.2.
A cut-free 1-backtracking play of a finite game G =< T, t >, or a 1-bck. play for short, is some (finite non-empty or infinite) sequence of β = x 0 , x 1 , . . . , x i . . . of positions of the play G. We require that, for each x i+1 in β,
is an E-position, then x i+1 is a child in T of some E-position x j , for some 0 ≤ j ≤ i, which is an ancestor of x i . We call x j the position E backtracks to from x i , and x i+1 the new move of x i from x j .
We define now the turn map and a winning condition on infinite plays. If we start from a finite play G, an infinite play can only arise if E backtracks infinitely many times to the same positions. If she does it she loses, therefore E loses all infinite plays. 
We introduce now winning strategies of bck cf (G). Informally, a winning strategy is some way of selecting one move of E from any E-position. Besides, if E always plays, from any E-position, the move selected from the winning strategy, then she always wins, no matter what the moves of A are. We identify a winning strategy with some set of finite plays, namely, the set of all plays in which E follows the strategy.
Definition 2.4. Let G =< T, t > be any finite game. A winning strategy W of bck cf (G) is any well-founded subtree of T cf such that,
(1) If p ∈ W and p is an A-position, all one-step extension q of p in T are in W, (2) If p ∈ W and p is an E-position, there exists one and only one m ∈ E such that p::m ∈ W (i.e., p has a unique one-step extension in W).
Formulas and Tarski games
In this section we introduce the set of formulas for ω-arithmetic, and Tarski games for them. For an intuitive motivation of Tarski games we refer to [6] , §3. (1) We call L the language consisting of one symbol of predicate for each recursive predicate, and of one symbol of function for each recursive function. (2) We call L pos the set of closed formulas of L in the connectives ∨, ∧, ∃, ∀.
We call any A ∈ L pos just a formula, for short. We call any Γ ∈ List(L pos ) an ordered sequent, or just a sequent for short.
L pos , and all a ∈ L pos true atomic. (4) We call disjunctive formulas, or E-formulas, all formulas A∨B, ∃xA ∈ L pos , and all a ∈ L pos false atomic. Conjunctive formulas are all formulas with first symbol ∧, ∀, true. Disjunctive formulas are all formulas with first symbol ∨, ∃, false. We also call conjunctive and disjunctive formulas A-formulas and E-formulas, because, in Tarski games, formulas are positions, and player A moves from conjunctive formulas, and player E moves from disjunctive formulas. We now define a tree whose nodes are (corresponding to) all subformulas of A ∈ L pos . Definition 3.2. The subformula tree (1) For i = 1, 2, we say that A i is the one-step subformula of
For n ∈ N , we say that A(n) is the one-step subformula of ∀x.A(x), ∃x.A(x), of index n ∈ N . We say that B is a subformula of A if there is a chain of one-step subformulas from A to B. (2) Fix some * ∈ N (say, * = 0). Let A ∈ L pos . The subformula tree T A of A is defined as the set of all lists x = * , i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ List(N ), such that there is a sequent A 0 , . . . , A k , with A = A 0 , and with A h+1 subformula of index i h+1 of A h , for all 0 ≤ h < k. We call x a position of the subformula A h of A. We define a map form :
The only position of A in T A is the root * of T A . In general, however, a subformula of A can have many different positions in T A . T A is a well-founded tree: all branches of T A are finite because they correspond to shorter and shorter subformulas of A.
We can now define a Tarski game for A ∈ L pos . The tree of position is the subformula tree of A. Intuitively, E defends the truth of A and A the falsity of A. In order to defend the truth of a disjunctive formula, E chooses an immediate subformula A i of A she believes to be true. E defends the truth of A by defending the truth of A i . In order to defend the truth of a conjunctive formula, A chooses an immediate subformula A i of A he believes to be false. A defends the falsity of A by defending the falsity of A i . Eventually, the play ends in some atomic subformula a of A. If a is true then E wins, if a is false then A wins. 3 Here is the formal definition.
Definition 3.3. The Tarski Game G A of a formula A ∈ L pos is the finite game < T A , t A > defined as follows.
(1) T A is the (well-founded) subformula tree of A.
(2) For all p ∈ T A ,we set t A (p) = A if p is an A-formula (i.e., the position of a conjunctive formula), and t A (p) = E if p is an E-formula (i.e., the position of a disjunctive formula).
We end this section by defining what are list of positions for a sequent of L pos , and we associate to each node x ∈ T A a sequent Γ in a "canonical" way. This association will be used to define the isomorphism between proofs and strategies. Definition 3.4. Let x ∈ T A and B ∈ L pos . Assume L = x 0 , . . . , x m is a list of positions in T A , and Γ is a sequent (a list of formulas).
• When B = form(p) is conjunctive, we say that the position p of B in T A is conjunctive, or is an A-node. When B is disjunctive, we say that p is disjunctive, or is an E-node.
as the list of positions E can backtrack to from x (including x itself ). We say that a sequent Γ is A-disjunctive if there is 3 In the definition of Tarski play, this is obtained with a little trick. Nobody can move from an atomic a, because a has no immediate subformula. Therefore if a is true we make a conjunctive and we ask A to move next, in order to make him lose. If a is false we make a disjunctive and we ask E to move next, in order to make her lose.
some A-disjunctive list L = disj(x) of positions for Γ. We call Γ the canonical sequent labelling the node x ∈ T A .
If L is the canonical sequent labelling x, then, by definition of 1-bck. play, L is the list of all E-nodes (all disjunctive nodes) which are proper ancestors of x, plus x. 4 
Proofs
In this section we introduce P A 1 , a sub-classical logic whose proof trees will correspond exactly to all recursive winning strategies in Tarski games with 1-backtracking. Rules of P A 1 are introductions of some true atomic formula, or of ∨, ∧, ∀, ∃. All these rules are merged weakening adding a sequent ∆ of disjunctive formulas to the conclusion (possibly, ∆ is empty). Sequents are ordered and Exchange is skipped. (1) A pseudo-proof π of classical arithmetic without Exchange is a pair < T π , d π > of a well-founded T π over N, * , and a decoration d π , associating to each node p ∈ T a non-empty sequent Θ of L pos decorating it. d π is a recursive map and T is recursive. (2) A pseudo-proof π is a proof if for each node p ∈ T there is some sequent Γ, B, ∆ decorating p, with all formulas in ∆ disjunctive, and:
• If B is conjunctive, then the children of the node p are exactly all p::i ∈ T , one for each B i . The decoration of each p:
• If B is disjunctive, then p has only one descendant p::i ∈ T , corresponding to some B i . The decoration of p::i is Γ, B, B i .
In the picture above, we say that in p we have an introduction of B, and a true, ∨, ∃, ∧, ∀-introduction if the first symbol of B is true, ∨, ∃, ∧, ∀.
There is no introduction for atomic false formulas, but you can add them by Weakening, inside ∆. We often insert the rule name, true, ∨, ∃, ∧, ∀, in the righthand-side of a rule. We stress that a sequent is an (ordered) list, and that there is no rule permuting two formulas.
We briefly discuss the main features of P A 1 . The rule for disjunction involves contraction: we infer a disjunctive B j from B j , B j,i , instead of inferring B j , B j . All rules involve weakening, too: we add some disjunctive formulas B j+1 , . . . , B m to the conclusion. Weakening in its most general form (with both conjunctive 4 Alternatively, L is the list of ancestors of x with all A-nodes (all conjunctive nodes) = x skipped. The last node of L is x, that is, last(L) = x. The previous nodes in L are all disjunctive nodes proper ancestors of x. Alternatively again, we can define L = disj(x) by induction on x. If x = * , then disj(x) = * . Assume y = x::i, and disj(x) = x 0 , . . . , x m−1 , x . If x is conjunctive, we set disj(y) = x 0 , . . . , x m−1 , y (we skip x). If x is disjunctive, we set disj(y) = x 0 , . . . , x m−1 , x, y (we keep x).
and disjunctive formulas) is a derived rule, and so are Contraction, Exchange for formulas (not sequents), and Cut.
Lemma 4.1. Let Γ, ∆ be any sequents and A any formula.
(1) (Weakening) If Γ is derivable, then Γ, ∆ is, with a proof of the same (ordinal) height.
We skip the proof because it is not required in the rest of the paper. The last point is really unexpected: in full ω-arithmetic, cut elimination involves a superexponential grow in height of the proof, while in P A 1 , cut elimination reduces the height of a proof. Another curious feature concerns proofs of a singleton sequent {A}. All sequent in these proofs are lists A 0 , . . . , A n strictly decreasing under the subformula relation: A i+1 is a proper subformula of A i , for all i < n. Actually (Lemma 7.3), all these sequents are A-disjunctive sequents of the Tarski game of A with 1-backtracking. Besides (Lemma 7.2), in a proof of {A} we never merge Weakening and introduction of a conjunctive formula. That is, in any proof of {A}, all introductions of a conjunctive formula have the simplified form:
(one node for each B i )
The main result of the paper is:
For all A ∈ L pos , the class of proof-trees of the sequent {A} in P A 1 is pointwise isomorphic to the class of the recursive winning strategy for the 1-backtracking game for A. Besides, if a node of a proof and a position in a winning strategy are in correspondence in such isomorphism, then they are labelled with the same sequent.
The isomorphism theorem can be informally restated as follows. For any A ∈ L pos true in LCM , the proofs of A (in a suitable formal system P A 1 ) can be identified with strategies learning by "trial-and-error" the winning moves in the Tarski game for A. We postpone the proof of the isomorphism theorem to the appendix. In the next section, we include some examples of how the isomorphism works.
Examples
In this section we include some example of proofs of A in P A 1 defining 1-backtracking winning strategies for T A , and the other way round. The general idea is that a sequent A 1 , . . . , A n corresponds to a list of moves in a 1-bck. play, after we skip all moves to which E cannot backtrack. The introduction of a conjunctive formulas corresponds to all possible moves A can do from a given position. The introduction of a disjunctive formula corresponds to a winning move by E from a given position. If the rules involves a Weakening of n formulas, this means that E backtracks n positions before making her move.
Our first example is the proof of Excluded Middle for semi-decidable formulas we quoted in the introduction.
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has the following natural proof in P A 1 . In the proof tree below, we denote by P (n) a generic true (hence conjunctive) instance of P (x), and by P (m) a generic false (hence disjunctive) instance of P (x). Therefore ¬P (m) is true (hence conjunctive). We write boldface all formulas introduced by some rule. We write crossed out all formulas added by Weakening. The only formulas of this latter kind in the proof are all P (m).
We can translate this proof as a strategy learning the truth value of ∀xP (x) using backtracking. We obtain the same strategy we sketched in the introduction. For the first move, Eloise chooses either ∀xP (x) or ∃x¬P (x). Since Eloise does not know the witness of ∃x¬P (x), Eloise postpones the answer the witness, and chooses ∀xP (x). Then, Abelard chooses either some integer n such that P (n) is true, or some integer m such that P (m) is false. In the first case, the play goes to P (n). P (n) is true, hence Eloise wins. In the second case, the play goes to P (m), which is false. Then ¬P (m) is true. Thus m is a witness of ∃x¬P (x). Therefore, Eloise backtracks from P (m) to ∀xP (x)∨∃x¬P (x). This corresponds to introducing P (m) by Weakening. Eloise moves ∃x¬P (x) from ∀xP (x) ∨ ∃x¬P (x) this time. Again, the formula is disjunctive. Hence Eloise moves again. 5 Eloise chooses m and wins because ¬P (m) is true.
2-excluded middle.
We introduce now a proof corresponding to no winning strategy with 1-backtracking. Consider the law of excluded middle A ∨ ¬A. When Σ 0 2 -formulas, not only Σ 0 1 -formulas are allowed to be substituted into A, the schema is called the law of 2-Excluded Middle, or EM 2 . The proof of EM 2 requires Exchange rule for sequents, as it is illustrated by the proof below (in P A, not in P A 1 ). In the proof, A = ∀x∃yQ(x, y) and ¬A denotes ∃x∀y¬Q(x, y), B(x) = ∃yQ(x, y) and ¬B(x) denotes ¬B(x) = ∀y¬Q(x, y). Further, we assume that Q(n, k) is false while Q(n, l) is true. Formulas introduced by a rule are boldfaced, while formulas added by a weakening are crossed out. Exchange is labelled by Exch. The only formula subjected to Exchange, B(n), is not introduced but switched with A ∨ ¬A. 5 Remark that we did not ask in the definition of play that player alternate. It is essential to exchange B(n) and A ∨ ¬A. In this stage of the proof, we are supposed to prove B(n), that is, we are suppose to find some y which is a witness B(n) = ∃yQ(n, y). We do not know even whether such a y exists or not. Moreover we cannot introduce B(n) by weakening, otherwise we would stuck in a later stage of the proof, while proving A ∨ ¬A, ¬A, ¬Q(n, l) with Q(n, l) true. What Exchange does is to postpone the proof of B(n) after we fail proving ¬B(n) = ∀y¬Q(n, y). If and when we fail, we find some true Q(n, l), and we use y = l as a witness for it B(n) = ∃yQ(n, y) (look to the top right corner of the proof).
It is easier to understand how the proof works if we interpret it as a winning strategy of a backtracking game of Tarski game G A∨¬A . However, as we will show, we need a stronger form of backtracking than 1-backtracking for interpreting Exchange: we need backtracking in the sense of Coquand [2] . The interpretation of the proof runs as follow.
As in the case of EM 1 , Eloise chooses ∀x∃yQ(x, y) and Abelard chooses a subformula ∃yQ(n, y). Now the turn is Eloise's, but she does not know which Q(n, k) is true (if any). Therefore, she postpones to answer ∃yQ(n, y) and opens the dual game ¬A. She repeats Abelard's play and reaches ∀y¬Q(n, y). Abelard chooses either some integer k such that ¬Q(n, k) is true, or some integer l such that ¬Q(n, l) is false. In the first case, Eloise wins. In the second case, Q(n, l) is true. Eloise reopens the play for ∃yQ(n, y), and chooses l for y. The play goes to Q(n, l) which is true. Hence Eloise wins. This play is not a 1-bck. play, since backtracking from ¬Q(n, k) to ∃yQ(n, y) violates the condition 2 of Definition 2.2. Indeed, ∃yQ(n, y) is not an ancestor of the node ¬Q(n, k) in the subformula tree of A ∨ ¬A, therefore the backtracking we used is not 1-backtracking. Backtracking necessary for EM 2 is called 2-backtracking in [1] . In 1-bck. play, a position ∃yQ(n, y) becomes unreachable after Eloise backtracks from ∃yQ(n, y) to A ∨ ¬A, while the winning strategy for EM 2 requires to reactivate it. In the term of a proof, backtracking of 1-bck. play corresponds weakening, since formulas in the conclusions are discarded from the premises after 1-bck.. Instead, 2-backtracking and general backtracking correspond to exchange, since de-activated formulas are not discarded from the premises, but just pushed back in the sequent, and they can be recovered if we later need them.
5.3.
A "learning algorithm" corresponding to a classical proof. In this example, we first define a "learning strategy" (or 1-backtracking strategy) for the Tarski game of some formula A. Then we turn it into a proof in P A 1 of A. In this way we sketch how we can recover a proof from a "learning algorithm" in the sense of Hayashi. This is the formula A we consider. For any functions f, g 1 , g 2 from N (the set of natural numbers ) to N, there is some n ∈ N such that f (n) ≤ f (g 1 (n)) and f (n) ≤ f (g 2 (n)). We can find an n as required, by the following "learning" algorithm. First we choose n arbitrary, say n = 0, then:
Step 1:
, then n is a solution. Otherwise, either f (g 1 (n)) or f (g 2 (n)) is strictly smaller than f (n).
Step 2: If f (g 1 (n)) < f (n), then let n be g 1 (n) and return to step 1. If f (g 2 (n)) < f (n), then let n be g 2 (n) and return to step 1.
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Let n i be the i-the number used as n. Then f (n 1 ) > f (n 2 ) > . . . > f (n i ) > . . . by its construction. From f (n i ) ∈ N we conclude the algorithm eventually reaches some solution.
We can see this "learning" algorithm as a winning strategy with 1-backtracking of Tarski game of the formula ∃n. 0) ). If the formula Abelard chooses is true, then Eloise wins. Otherwise, Eloise backtracks to ∃n.f (n) ≤ f (g 1 (n)) ∧ f (n) ≤ f (g 2 (n)) and chooses another n by using Abelard's move, as follows.
, and Eloise uses this information to refine n further. E repeats this sequence of moves over and over again. Eloise always wins by the same reason why the algorithm above is terminating.
We can translate this strategy to the proof of ∃n.
, where i j = 1, 2 for 0 ≤ j ≤ k. In the picture below, we assume that the only atomic true formula is (f (m) ≤ f (g 2 (m))). Then, the proof has the following form. We write boldface all formulas introduced by some rule, and crossed out all formulas added by Weakening.
For the reverse direction, it is easy to see that the proof corresponds the strategy given above. In the workshop version of the paper, we cut here the example section for reason of space. In the technical report, instead, we include two more elaborated examples of the correspondence proof-strategy. We take an algorithm learning some minimum point of f : N → N, and we turn it into a proof that the minimum point exists. Then we define an algorithm learning an infinite weakly increasing subsequence from any infinite sequence over N, and we turn it into a proof that such infinite subsequence exists.
In appendix we generalize to all proofs and all strategies the correspondence we just defined between some proofs and some strategies.
Trees
In this section we introduce some (routine) coding and some terminology for trees.
We denote with List(I) the set of finite lists of a set I. For any x, y ∈ List(I), we denote "x is a prefix of y" and "x is a proper prefix of y" with x ≤ y and x < y. Let x = i 0 , . . . , i k−1 ∈ List(I) denote any list. If x is not empty, we denote with drop(x) = x 0 , . . . , x k−2 ∈ List(I) and last(x) = x k−1 ∈ I the list x with the last element dropped, and the last element of x. For any 0 ≤ h < k we denote i 0 , . . . , i h the prefix of x with all elements up to the index h, with x h. If f : I → J, we define a map Map(f ) : List(I) → List(J) by applying f to each item in x: Map(f )(x) = f (i 0 ), . . . , f (i k−1 ) . If i ∈ I, we denote i 0 , . . . , i k−1 , i with x::i. We call any x::i a one-step extension of x. We associate :: to the left: x::i::j is short for (x::i)::j. We have drop(x::i) = x and last(x::i) = i and Map(f )(x::i) = Map(f )(x)::f (i).
Definition 6.1. Let E be any set and * E ∈ E. A tree T over E, * E is a set of finite non-empty lists e 0 , . . . , e k , with e 0 , . . . , e k ∈ E and e 0 = * E , such that:
(1) * E is the minimum of T under prefix.
(2) T is closed under non-empty prefixes: if p ∈ T and = q < p, then q ∈ T .
When no ambiguity arises we write * for * E . If T is a tree on E, * , we call * ∈ T the root of T , and * the starting symbol of T .
7 If both x, x::i ∈ T , we say that x::i is the child of x of index i, and that x is the father of x::i. We say that x is an ancestor of y if x ≤ y. An infinite branch of T is any infinite sequence e 0 , e 1 , e 2 . . . whose non-empty finite prefixes are all in T . A subtree U of T is a subset U of T which is still a tree. Assume U is a tree over some F, * F . Then a morphism φ : T → U between T, U is any map sending the root of T into the root of U , and compatible with father/child relation (that is, φ( * E ) = * F , and for all x::a ∈ T there is some b ∈ F such that φ(x::a) = φ(x)::b). φ is an isomorphism if and only if φ is invertible, and φ −1 is still a morphism. By definition unfolding, we can now precise the details of the coding of bck cf . 8
First properties of proofs
We list here a few well-known combinatorial properties we will need while proving the main theorem. We use the tree terminology from §6. For proofs we refer to the technical report [0] .
Lemma 7.1. Let φ : T → U be any morphism between two trees T, U . Let f : A → B and g : B → A. Denote the identities over A, B with id A , id B .
(1) φ is an isomorphism if and only if φ is a bijection (i.e.: if φ is invertible, then its inverse is a morphism). (2) For any x ∈ T , x and φ(x) have the same length. (3) If gf = id A , then f is an injection and g a surjection.
(4) If gf = id A , and either f g = id B , or f is a surjection, or g is an injection, then f, g are opposite bijections.
The first property of proofs we derive is the following:
Lemma 7.2.
(1) If π is a proof of a sequent Γ, and all formulas in Γ before the last one are disjunctive, then the same holds for all sequents in the proof.
(2) If π is a proof a singleton sequent {A}, then all introductions of conjunctive formulas in π use no weakening, that is, they always introduce the last formula of the sequent.
A well-known property of (cut-free) proofs is the following. All sequents Γ decorating a proof π of a formula A consist of subformulas of A (proof: by induction over π, using the fact we have no cut rule in PA 1 ). Our next step is to fix some canonical choice for the list of positions of all sequent Γ labelling a proof π.
Definition 7.1. Let π be any proof of a formula A. We say that ψ π : T → List(T A ) is a decoration of π with list of positions if for all p ∈ π, ψ π (p) is a position of d π (p). We say that ψ π is canonical if for all p::i ∈ π, M = ψ π (p) and L = ψ π (p::i), we have L = M ::(x::i), for some M ≤ M and some x in M .
Using drop, last from §6 , we can reformulate the definition of canonical decoration by: drop(L) ≤ M and drop(last(L)) is in M , and last(last(L)) = i, for all L, M as above. For each π =< T, d π , d π > proof of formula A there is exactly one canonical decoration. We define ψ π by induction over p, as follows.
(1) ψ π ( * ) = * . 8 Let E be the set of moves of G. Then T cf is a tree over the set T of positions of the game G, therefore T cf ⊆ List(T ). Since T ⊆ List(E), we are coding the set T cf of positions of bck cf (G) with some subset of List 2 (E) (some set of lists of lists of moves of the original game G). The starting symbol of T cf is * E (a list), while the root is * E (a list of lists).
• The two cases in the definition of ψ π cannot superpose, because B m is either conjunctive or disjunctive. The two cases cover all proofs of a formula A by Lemma 7.2.2. If p is any node of the proof π of A, we call ψ π (p) the list of positions associated to p in the canonical decoration. Now we derive some property of canonical decorations.
Lemma 7.3. Assume that π, π are any proofs of A. Then:
(1) A canonical decoration of π is unique.
(2) For all p ∈ π, ψ π (p) is some A-disjunctive chain.
(3) ψ π is a canonical decoration of π with lists of positions, and last 2 (ψ(p)) = last(p) for all p ∈ π. (4) If π, π have equal trees, and equal decorations ψ π , ψ π on these trees, then they are equal proofs.
An intermediate step between proofs and strategies
Fix any A ∈ L pos . We define a class of trees associated to A we call proofstrategy trees. A proof-strategy tree can be seen either as a proof of A, or as a winning strategy for the Tarski game for A. In order to achieve such effect, proofstrategiesare heavily cluttered with redundant information. In the next sections we will show that both proofs and proof-strategies, and proof-strategiesand winning strategies are pointwise isomorphic classes of trees. Besides, all these isomorphisms preserve the sequent labelling each node. We will conclude the same result for proofs and strategies.
Intuitively, a proof-strategyof A is a proof π of A in which we replaced each sequent Γ of π by its canonical list of positions. The list of positions of any sequent Γ is an extra information we can add to a proof. It is not strictly required, because it can be recovered from the proof. We only consider it in order to make the correspondence between proofs and strategy more evident.
Intuitively again, a proof-strategy can be seen as a strategy in which we replaced each move x with the A-disjunctive chain of x (the list L = x 0 , . . . , x m of moves E can backtrack to, including x itself, which is x m ). This list L is an extra information we can add to a winning strategy, not strictly required in order to code a winning strategy, because it can be recovered from the position x. Definition 8.1. A proof-strategy is any tree P over List(T A ) (over the set of all lists of positions), having * ∈ List(T A ) as starting symbol, and such that, for all Y = X::(L::x) ∈ S:
• If x is an A-node, then the one-step extensions Z of Y in S are exactly all Z = Y ::(L::(x::i)), for all x::i ∈ T A .
• If x is an E-node, then Y has a unique one-step extension Z in S, and Z = Y ::(M ::y::(y::i)), for some prefix M ::y ≤ L::x, and some y::i ∈ T A . If X ∈ P , we call the sequent Γ of position last(X) the canonical sequent labelling X.
By induction on X ∈ P we can prove that all X ∈ P are lists of A-disjunctive chain. A remark about coding: A-disjunctive chains are in List 2 (N ), therefore P is (coded by) some subset of List 3 (N ), or some set of: lists of lists of lists of integers.
The next Lemma states a first relationship between proofs and proof-strategies. Assume that a proof π and a proof-strategyP are isomorphic trees, that the isomorphism preserves the last integer in a node, and that the isomorphism defines a list decoration of π. In this case, the isomorphism defines a canonical list decoration of π.
Lemma 8.1. Assume p → X p is an isomorphism between some proof-strategyP and some proof-tree π, such that last(p) = last 3 (X p ) for all p ∈ π. Assume furthermore that p → last(X p ) is a list decoration of the proof-tree. Then this list decoration is canonical.
proof-strategiesand strategies are pointwise isomorphic
In this section we show that we can interpret a proof-strategyfor A as a strategy for the cut-free 1-backtracking game for A.
We can define a pair Ψ 2 , Φ 2 of pointwise isomorphisms between proof-strategies and strategies for A, as follows. Intuitively, we replace each list of positions with its last element to turn a proof-strategyinto a strategy. Conversely, we replace each position of Tarski game T A with the A-disjunctive list of position associated to it, in order to turn a strategy into a proof-strategy.
Here is the formal definition. Let last : List(T A ) → T A be the map taking the last element of a list over T A . Then we set ψ 2 = Map(last) : List 2 (T A ) → List(T A ). Conversely, let disj : T A → List(T A ) be the map computing the Adisjunctive chain for a given x ∈ T A . Then we set φ 2 = Map(disj) : List(T A ) → List 2 (T A ). Eventually, for any proof-strategy P we define a strategy W = Ψ 2 (P ) = {ψ 2 (X)|X ∈ P }. For any strategy W we define a proof-strategy P = Φ 2 (W ) = {φ 2 (L)|L ∈ W }. Lemma 9.1.
(1) ψ 2 φ 2 (L) = L, for all L ∈ List(T A ), and ψ 2 φ 2 (X) = X, for all lists X of A-disjunctive chains.
(2) If P is a proof-strategy, then ψ 2 , φ 2 are opposite tree isomorphisms, and Ψ(W ) is a winning strategy. (3) If W is a winning strategy, then φ 2 , φ 2 are opposite tree isomorphisms, and Φ 2 (W ) is a proof-strategy. (4) Ψ 2 , Φ 2 are pointwise isomorphisms. If a node X ∈ P and a play p ∈ W are in correspondence through ψ 2 , φ 2 , then they are labelled by the same sequent.
Proofs and proof-strategiesare pointwise isomorphic
In this section we show that we can interpret any proof-strategyP as the canonical decoration of some proof π with lists of positions.
Fix any A ∈ L pos . We define a pair Ψ 1 , Φ 1 of pointwise isomorphism between proofs and proof-strategies for A, as follows. Intuitively, we get a proofstrategyfrom a proof by replacing each sequent by its canonical position. We get a proof from a proof-strategyby replacing back each list of position of a sequent by the sequent. Formally, for any proof π of A, if p = i 0 , . . . , i k ∈ π, we set ψ 1 (p) = ψ π (p 0), . . . , ψ π (p k) (where p k is p itself). Alternatively, we set ψ 1 ( * ) = * , and ψ 1 (p::i) = ψ 1 (p)::ψ π (p::i). Then we define a proofstrategyP = Ψ 1 (π) as the set {ψ 1 (p)|p ∈ π} of lists of A-disjunctive chains. By definition, the last element of ψ 1 (p) is ψ π (p k) = ψ π (p), the canonical list of positions decorating p.
Set φ 1 = Map(last 2 ). Alternatively, φ 1 ( ) = , and if Y ∈ List 3 (N ) is a one-step extension of X, then φ(Y ) = φ(X)::last 3 (Y ). For any proof-strategy P , we define a proof π. The proof-tree is T = {φ 1 (X)|X ∈ P }. We claim that φ 1 is a tree-isomorphism : P → T . Let X = φ −1 1 (p) = L 0 , . . . , L m . Then the decoration d π (p) of the node p ∈ T is the sequent having list of positions L m = last(X) (i.e., it is Form(last(X))). Eventually, for any proof-strategy P we define the proof π = Φ 1 (P ) = T, d π .
Lemma 10.1.
(1) If π is any proof, then ψ 1 , φ 1 are opposite tree isomorphisms, and Ψ 1 (π) is a proof-strategy.
(2) If P is any proof-strategy, then φ 1 is a tree isomorphism, π = Φ 1 (P )
is a proof, and last(φ 
